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Introduction
is a piece of contemporary military and political history by
the man who played the chief role in the enactment of events it
H
describes.
ERE

Less than a year ago, even to some of the best informed people in
America and Britain, Tito was little more than a mysterious name.
Today he is one of the most vivid figures to emerge from World War II,
and the movement he heads is beginning to be understood as having
not only Yugoslav but wider European significance.
As leader of a people who know what they want and are ready to
sacrifice everything to get it, Tito has successfully conducted military
operations in the face of almost impossible odds, accomplishing more
with fewer tools of war than any other general, Allied or enemy, in
this global conflict. At the same time, he developed step by step into
a statesman of great force and tact, able to offer his complicated and
hard-pressed country a political and cultural leadership that is both
wise and shrewd. He became a personal symbol and center of a swiftly
evolving sitpation: Yugoslavia in the throes of fighting her way clear
into a better future.
One explanation of Tito's leadership is that he is an unusually fine
and well-balanced human being. If he were not that, he would not
have been accepted by the common people of Yugoslavia.
Allied officers coming out of embattled Yugoslavia have told about
Tito in superlatives. He is nothing if not a natural democrat. He is
personally incapable of becoming a dictator. If he can avoid it at all,
he does not kill men who oppose him even after they have been
sentenced to death by the courts of Yugoslav People's Liberation Council. Once he is said to have remarked: "One of the easiest things in
the world is to kill a man." He has come up the hard way.
Reading this narrative of what happened in Yugoslavia since the
spring of 1941, one is impressed by the fact that Tito has little to say
about his own role in the process which he inspired and led. The
first-person singular pronoun is used only when it cann~t be avoided.
Then it is used straight-forwardly, matter-of-factly.
Straight-forwardness and matter-of-factness characterize the whole
story. From all reports, they have characterized Tito's conduct of the
military operations and political developments. Through him work
the compulsions of history.
For a long time, as already suggested, Tito and his movement were
ill-understood in America and Britain. No doubt, this narrative was
written to help remedy that situation. It was written in February,
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1944, when Major Randolph Churchill, son of the British Prime Minister, arrived in Yugoslavia as his father's personal representative. A
few months later-in June-Major Churchill said in the course of an
interview:
"I was most vividly impressed with the fact that the Partisan movement is very much better organized than I had expected. We had
heard about the gallant struggle which the Partisans are waging, a
struggle that has evoked general enthusiasm in England and America.
But we did not know that the organization was so complete, in particular the civil administration. What Marshal Tito and the Partisans
have done should serve as an example to all enslaved peoples of
Europe.
"They have perfected the technique of guerilla war in a manner
rarely ever witnessed before. The way in which, starting from scratch,
they have built up such a fine army with so excellent an ' organization
sounds like a beautiful and romantic story. It is this which has
evoked the great admiration of Americans and Englishmen.
"I have seen the lands completely ravaged. While traveling here
from Bosnia, I was horrified when I witnessed the extent to which the
whole countryside had been ruined. I never dreamed that the ravage
would be so considerable. Villages burnt and pillaged by the enemy,
without any struggle. Now I understand with what hardships the
people and the Army are grappling and how much the population
has suffered.
"Wherever I have been, I came across the greatest enthusiasm on
the part of the people for the national liberation struggle. I was most
impressed by the way in which the Partisan movement has succeeded
in uniting all elements which form Yugoslavia. This is the more significant, since Yugoslavia is composed of various peoples.
"The Partisan movement has succeeded in overcoming local frictions and uniting all popular forces of Yugoslavia. This has impressed
me most deeply. Apart from the splendid successes on the battlefield,
this is indeed a triumph of statesmanship for Marshal Tito. He has
succeeded in welding and molding all groups into one whole.
"In Yugoslava one can see in miniature the new Europe which is
being born. Just as Partisan warfare should serve as an inspiring
example to other enslaved peoples, so the political set-up here should
serve as a model for political construction to the other nations of
Europe.
"Marshal Tito has shown himself to be as great a statesman as he
is a warrior. I am convinced that the principles of tolerance and liberalism which are so characteristic of the National Liberation movement will ensure Yugoslavia a happier future."
LOUIS AoAMIC.
Milford, New Jersey,
August 10, 1944.
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o GIVE the world-deceived as it has been on every side-a clear
picture of the real situation in Yugoslavia it is necessary briefly to
review developments in Yugoslavia before its occupation by the enemy
and up to the present time.
In his statement in the House of Commons about Yugoslavia's
struggle against the invaders Prime Minister Churchill declared "Com, munist elements had the honor of being the beginners, but as the
movement has increased in strength and numbers a modifying and
unifying process has taken place and national conceptions have supervened." These laconic words express a fact which constitutes the pride
not only of the Communists but of all other patriots among the peoples
of Yugoslavia. Long before the attack on Yugoslavia-especially after
the occupation of Austria and despite the fact that they were working
under the most difficult of conditions because they had been declared
an illegal group-the Yugoslav Communists constantly warn~d against
the terrible danger threatening the peoples of Yugoslavia from predatory German fascism. They made every effort to rally all patriotic
forces of the country to repulse a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Their
efforts were not in vain. Responding to repeated appeals, the young
people of Yugoslavia, especially high school students, young workers
and the students in Belgrade University, prepared to face the hour of
trial which Hitler's invasion had brought upon the country.
What was the situation prevailing in the ruling circles of Yugoslavia? Both militarily and politically Yugoslavia was in a state of
chaos. Leading positions on the general military staff were held by
such traitors in the service of the Germans as General N edich. Moreover Yugoslavia swarmed with German spies who had come as
"tourists."
Corruption and embezzlement reigned supreme in all Ministries,
especially in that of War. Out of a total state budget of 12 billion
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dinars 4 billions were allocated to war needs. And yet Yugoslavia was
poorly armed and unprepared to defend itself. Nationality problemsparticularly that of the Croats-became increasingly sharp. The compromise reached in the agreement between Machek and Cvetkovich
actually covered only the sharing of power. It did not by any means
solve the Croat nationality question. After 1935, with the advent of
Stoyadinovich to power, the rulers in Belgrade steadily strengthened
their connections with Axis countries while simultaneously they drifted
away from their old alliances-for example from the Little Entente,
and from their alliance with France and other countries. Everything
was done to isolate Yugoslavia and to weaken her in order to make her
an easy prey for the German invaders.
Yugoslavia was almost the only country in Europe whose rulers
for twenty years ignored the people's demands that diplomatic relations be established with the Soviet Union. Recognition came only
when the German invaders were loudly knocking on Yugoslavia's door.
March 27, 1941 will go down in the history of our people as one
of our most memorable dates. Following the shameful signing of the
"Tripartite Pact" and Yugoslavia's adherence to the Axis the regime
of the traitor Prince Paul-in which Cvetkovich and Machek played
the leading roles-was overthrown. Monster demonstrations throughout Yugoslavia, particularly in Belgrade, showed that the peoples of
Yugoslavia preferred to make the greatest of sacrifices rather than
become Axis slaves and see the glorious traditions of their ancestors
betrayed.
But the new Simovich Government which succeeded the Cvetkovich
Government proved unequal to its task because it failed to estimate
the strength of the peoples correctly or to rely upon it. Furthermore
it left intact the old corrupt state apparatus which was not only
incompetent but openly sabotaged all measures necessary for the
country's defense.
The ten days during which the invaders defeated our country constitute the most shameful period in its history. They brought out in
bold relief all the rottenness, all the treachery hitherto covered up
artificially. Were the peoples of Yugoslavia really willing to defend
their country? Yes, they were. As soon as mobilization was announced,
peasants, workers, young people and honest intellectuals rallied to the
colors. Replying to a special summons from the leadership of the
Communist party all party members fit for military service hastened
to enroll. But this fighting ardor was in vain, for the politicians and
the military leadership had betrayed the country. Volunteers were
shifted from one recruiting station to another. Incorrect orders were
6

given to troop trains. Soldiers were dispatched to the front without
ammunition. When matters had ,reached the point of surrender the
commanding general and other high-ranking officers ordered their
soldiers-under threat of shooting-to lay down their arms. In hundreds of cases the soldiers refused to carry out these commands.
Yet entire divisions and armies surrendered to the Germans almost
without a struggle and the men were driven off into German slavery.
General Milan Nedich (the Serbian Quisling who forced his units,
to their certain doom, to face German tanks without any anti-tank
weapons) was one of the first officers to surrender his army to the
Germans. Seeing this vile treachery, soldiers burst into tears of indignation and wherever they succeeded in escaping from the grip of the
German troops of occupation they left for their homes, uttering
imprecations.
Thereupon the most horrible days in the history of our peoples
set in. The Croats were mercilessly tortured by the U stashi, headed
by the criminal Croatian Quisling, Dr. Ante Pavelich, a creature of
Mussolini and Hitler, who came to power in Croatia. A mass slaughter
of Serbs was launched in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Slavonia, Vojvodina
and elsewhere. Unfortunate peasants in these regions, together with
their families, sought safety in the forests. But the Ustashi and the
Germans savagely hunted these refugees down and destroyed them
wherever they succeeded in locating them. The same terrible fate was
suffered by all honest progressives in the country. Gradually people
throughout Serbia began to offer resistance-at first unorganizedfighting for their lives with every means at their disposal. The same
situation prevailed in Slovenia, where Germans and Hungarians began
the destruction of entire villages, shipping tens of thousands of townsmen and peasants off to work in Germany.

The Resistance Takes Its First Steps

T

leadership of the Communist party took every possible step to
organize a popular uprising. As early as the autumn of 1940, and
in strict secrecy, a so-called Military Committee had been set up. This
Committee was charged with the task of fostering a spirit of resistance
among sol,diers and officers of the Yugoslav Army in case of foreign
attack and with taking over military leadership if the country should
surrender. After the April surrender this Committee was broadened
and became known as General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia. Later this was reorganized into the High ComHE
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mand. Immediately following the surrender of Yugoslavia and the
mass extermination of the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia the
Communist party sent its members to organize the refugees in the
forest into guerrilla detachments.
Prior to the attack of the Hitlerite ho~des against the Soviet Union,
leaders of the Communist party in Yugoslavia had concluded an
agreement with Dragoljub Jovanovich, leader of the Serbian Agrarian
party, and with a group led by Dr. Ivan Ribar. On June 22, when
the German armies suddenly invaded Russia, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist party held an urgent meeting with the Military
Committee at which it was decided to start revolts throughout Yugoslavia.
The men present also decided to rename the Military Committee
the General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia and to place it in charge of operations throughout the country.
This headquarters dispatched members to various provinces to supervise the organization of guerrilla detachments and to conduct operations. Moreover territorial units were organized to wreck telephone
and telegraph communications and to attack stores and other military
objectives. During that period the youth of Belgrade displayed a
heroism which will constitute the pride of our peoples for many
generations to come. In broad daylight young girls and lads of fourteen
attacked German trucks, poured kerosene on them and destroyed
them. Defying the gallows set up in Terasia Square, Belgrade, high
schools and university students and young workers carried out acts of
sabotage with mounting vigor.
Whereas, before the attack on the Soviet Union, the only joint
struggle (outside the cities) had been carried on in certain parts of the
Bosnian and Hercegovinian mountains the guerilla movement rapidly
spread across the rest of the country after the Soviet Union had been
invaded. By July 1941 the Valjevo, Kragujevac, Uzice, Homolj and
• other guerrilla detachments were already making forays against the
enemy. Operating in groups of twenty to thirty men, armed with one
or two rifles and a few bombs they attacked small German groups and
procured arms from the Germans whom they killed.

Growth of the Guerrilla Movement
the guerrilla movement grew and acquired a mass character
W
in Serbia, a general uprising of the people under the leadership
of the Communists had already been organized in Montenegro by
HILE

July 13, 1941. At a given signal ten thousand Montenegrins attacked
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Italian garrisons throughout Montenegro, occupied all towns with the
exception of Cetinje and Podgorica, took some six thousand Italian
soldiers and officers prisoner and captured rich booty.
Montenegrin patriots had begun their hard and bloody struggle
against the several Italian divisions Mussolini had sent to suppress
the revolt.
By August 1941 guerrilla detachments in Serbia had liberated
Posavina as fat as Obrenovac, hearly all of Macva, and had occupied
the towns of Lajkovac, Jabljik, Krupanj, Loznica and Stolac. Early
in September they captured Uzice, Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega, GornjiMilanovac and other small localities. Thus, guerrillas liberated almost
all of Western Serbia and a considerable part of Eastern Serbia.
Under the extremely difficult conditions which prevailed in August
the Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia were
moved from Belgrade to the small town of Krupanj and, later, to
Uzice. At the beginning of September 1941 the first military conference
was held in the Stolac mine, near Krupanj.
Notwithstanding all obstacles, delegates from Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Bosnia and other regions were present. The conference arrived
at far-reaching and important decisions. The principal headquarters
were renamed High Command for the GuerrillC\ Detachments of
Yugoslavia; and divisional headquarters were set up for Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro (with commanders who were also
members of the High Command). In addition to arriving at purely
military decisions (such as, for example, the decision to collaborate
with all other forces which had not sold themselves to the invaders)
the conference adopted the Belgrade plan for clearing Western Serbia
and mapped out a scheme for the conduct of military operations and
for the establishment of bases in all other parts of Yugoslavia.
Although the principal headquarters for the guerrilla detachments
were still located in Belgade it was learned that Colonel Draja Mihailovich was hiding somewhere in the mountains of Ravna Gora with a
group of officers who sought to escape capture by the enemy. Up to
that moment Mihailovich had not fought in a single battle and
Bosnian peasants who rebelled to defend their lives had never been
under his command. As long ago as July, 1941, I personally left
instructions at the headquarters of the Valjevo guerrilla detachment
to establish contact with l\,f;hailovich and induce him to agree to
collaborate with us in a joint struggle.
But he categorically refused to make any move against the Germans-first because he had no armed forces whatever at his command
and, second, because he feared reprisals. Our headquarters came into
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possession of an interesting document. Through this document a
member of the Mihailovich group who is close to us informed us that
Mihailovich was about to send to Bosnia some insubordinate officers
who wanted to fight the invader. Among them was lieutenant Ratko
Martinovich who along with a priest, Vlado Zechevich, had collaborated with us from the very earliest days of the, German occupation,
organizing detachments of Chetniks in the Krupanj areas. This document further revealed that Mihailovich had decided to kill Martinovich (with the aid of a criminal) when the latter crossed the Drina.

My Meeting w~th Mihailovich
•

upon my arrival in liberated territory in August 1941
IVojvoda
I went to see Mihailovich in Ravna Gora. He received me in
Mishich's house in the village of Struganik instead of in his
MMEDIATELY

own eyrie of Ravna Gora. Also present at the meeting were Major
Mishich and the notorious advocate of a greater Serbia, Dragisha
Vasich. These conversations yielded poor results. Saying that the
time was not yet ripe and advancing other excuses Mihailovich stubbornly refused to begin to war on the Germans. At that time he
already commanded some detachments of Chetniks whom his officers
had organized in territory liberated by the guerrillas in Western
Serbia. We got no further than to reach a verbal agreement that
Mihailovich's Chetniks would maintain a loyal attitude toward the
guerrillas and wouldn't attack them. Vojvoda Pechanat's Chetniks did.
Since for some unknown reason Mihailovich mistook me for a
Russian and remained under that impression for some time, he spoke
openly about the Croats and the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Asked
his opinion of the national problem, he openly declared that Croats,
Moslems and others must be mercilessly punished and that, after
retribution had been exacted, they must be completely subordinated
to the Serbs.
When I objected he replied that this program was fully justified
inasmuch as all Croats were responsible for the Ustashi atrocities and
that all who had sold out Yugoslavia to the Germans were Ustashi
and traitors. In conclusion Draja promised to think it over and
inform me how and when his units would begin the struggle.
In September our guerrilla forces, together with one detachment
led by Rachich, besieged and attacked Sabac. Rachich also won
Mihailovich's disfavor at that time for joining us in the struggle. The
attack didn't succeed. Germans quickly brought up two of their
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divisions, two or three Croat regiments and several units from
Ljotich's Serbian fascist movement and began their first offensiveone which, with interruptions, lasted until the end of November.
Fighting was most violent in Macva, Cer, Porcerina, in the J adar
Valley and in Cavlak. Our units slowly retreated, stubbornly defending every inch of ground.
Before the German offensive was launched it was decided that
peasants from Macva should transfer as large stocks of grain as possible
to highlands near Krupanj and Sokolska Plan ina. Thousands upon
thousands of peasant carts moved in the direction of the mountains.
Constantly shelled by German bombers the peasants sought safety in
the forests. The Germans succeeded in occupying Loznica and the
area stretching up to the Jadar Valley. But with almost no anti-tank
weapons our men succeeded in destroying 20 German tanks. More
than 1,000 enemy soldiers fell in these battles and an additional 600
were taken prisoners. Having encountered very strong resistance and
suffered heavy losses, the Germans didn't dare to continue the offensive
in the highlands and began energetic preparations for offensive operations on a wide front, from Kraljevo in the direction of Valjevo up
to the Drina River. Our guerrilla detachments again launched a
counteroffensive and recaptured the greater part of Macva and Posavina, while the biggest guerrilla detachment-the Valjevo detachment-completely encircled the German garrison in Valjevo.
Jointly with Mihailovich's Chetniks our units also encircled the
town of Kral jevo and with the aid of heavy artillery and tanks broke
into the town. As early as October some 1,200 of Mihailovich's Chetniks participated jointly with our units in the military operations at
Kraljevo and Valjevo. This was accomplished because at the time of
the offensive against us I sent a letter to Mihailovich from Krupanj
indicating the danger that would result from our loss of the liberated
territory. Mihailovich agreed and his units fought with us from
October until November 1941. But even during this brief period of
joint action the Chetniks under the command of Major Mishich fled
to Valjevo from the battlefields after the first serious clashes with the
Germans, leaving guerrilla units to fight alone. After our guerrilla
units had liberated Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega and Gornji-Milanovac,
Mihailovich's officers began an energetic mobilization of the peasantry
in our liberated territory in the name of the King and under the
slogan, "Those who join the Chetniks will remain in their homes
while those who join the guerrillas will forfeit their lives in unequal
battles at the front." Although the guerrillas freed Western Serbia,
the Chetnik command was granted permission to organize its units in
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liberated territory and to organize joint local Chetnik and guerrilla
squads in Cacak, Uzice, Gornji-Milanovac and other towns.
During the liberation of Uzice we captured rich military prizesfor example 100 motor vehicles, an arsenal, a tannery, a branch of the
People's Bank with some 55 million dinars in cash, etc. Our own
growing arsenal produced 150 rifles and 40,000 to 50,000 cartridges
daily (which we succeeded in stepping up to 420 rifles and 80,000
cartridges daily).
The successes achieved by our guerrillas evoked alarm among the
Germans and N edich's men on the one hand and envy on the part
of Mihailovich and his officers on the other. Even at that time, October
1941, they were secretly preparing to attack us with the object of
wresting U zice from us.
Nedich kept on sending more and more of his agents into the
ranks of Mihailovich's Chetniks and these agents engaged in systematic
provocation to produce an open clash between the guerrillas and the
Mihailovich Chetniks. Capturing Uzicka-Pozega, they constantly
harassed our railway communications at Cacak and Cornji-Milanovac
and provoked clashes with us.

I Visit the Chetniks Again
High Command did its utmost to avert such clashes and
through Mitich, liaison staff officer, again proposed to Mihailovich that he negotiate an agreement. It was suggested to Mihailovich
that negotiations be conducted in a neutral zone, near the township
of Kosoric, but he constantly sought to evade them. After this I again
went to Ravna Gora, accompanied by two members of the High Command, Sreten Zhujevich and Mitar Bakich. The draft proposal which
I prepared covered ten points; but during the negotiations in the
village of Brajici, near Ravna Cora (in the presence of some ten
officers from Mihailovich's staff), we failed to reach an agreement on
the most important point-the matter of the joint command. We had
proposed the formation of joint administrations based on the principle
of the People's Liberation Committee. Agreement was most easily
achieved on the matter of dividing deposits in the People's Bank and
armaments produced by the Uzice arsenal and on the question of
military commandants in the towns. On the day following negotiations
we immediately handed over to Mihailovich 500 new rifles and 25,000
cartridges from our arsenal. It is noteworthy that Mihailovich rejected
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my proposal that the British Captain Hudson, who was in the adjoining room, participate in the discussions.
On the fourth day after the negotiations Draja Mihailovich's
Chetniks attacked us at Dzicka-Posega with the very same rifles and
cartridges they had received from us. And at Dzicka-Pozega, after this
clash, Blagojevich, commander of our Sumadja detachment who was
returning from headquarters, was forced off his train and brutally
murdered by Captain Glishich's men. Captain Glishich himself acted
under Mihailovich's orders.
Because I was totally unaware of Blagojevich's fate, I sent a most
vigorous protest. to Mihailovich's headquarters demanding that the
commander be set free immediately. The reply came that nothing was
known about the arrest of the person named. At the same time we
came into possession of important documents from the Chetnik local
comfnand in Kremnja instructing all mobilized Chetniks to report on
November 2 at 5:00 A.M. at the forest ten kilometers from Dzice.
At once it became clear to us that Mihailovich was preparing an
armed attack on Dzice.
Our conclusion was confirmed by the fact that Mihailovich removed
800 of his Chetniks from Kraljevo, with the object (as we later learned)
of delivering an attack at Cacak. These Chetniks not only opened the
road to Kraljevo to the Germans; by deception (and for use in their
own attack at Cacak) they deprived our units along this front of
several heavy guns and a couple of tanks. We in turn were obliged to
withdraw one of our units from the front at Valjevo to defend Dzice
and Cacak. But subsequent events have clearly revealed that this
attack was planned in agreement with N edich, and even with the
Germans, to time it with the German attack before Kraljevo and up
the slopes of Turina.

We Must War on the Traitors
of the exact movements of the Chetnik units in the direction
A
of Uzice, we ordered our troops to deliver a counterattack on
November 2 at 4 A.M. Eight kilometers from Dzice, at the intersection
WARE

of three roads (Uzicka-Pozega, Uzice and Kosoric) our units met 800
Chetniks and, after a few hours of fighting, completely crushed them.
Several hundred Chetniks, including their commander, were killed.
We then issued orders for a general attack on Uzicka-Pozega, the
Chetniks' principal base. After an extremely bloody battle which
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lasted all day our units occupied Uzicka-Pozega and rapidly began to
press the Chetniks toward Ravna Gora.
Our units enveloped Ravna Gora from three sides-from the directions of Cacak, Gornji-Milanovac and Uzicka-Pozega. Seeing that he
was encircled, Mihailovich urgently dispatched liaison-officer Mitich
to our headquarters imploring us to stop this bloody struggle.
Although the guerrilla troops were animated by bitter hatred for
the Chetniks and wanted to put an end to this treacherous gang as
soon as possible, I agreed to stop the struggle on the following con:'
ditions:
1. Immediate withdrawal of Chetnik units to the Kameni-Cabrajic
line.
2. Immediate formation of a joint commission to investigate the
Uzicka-Pozega incident and other crimes.
3. Immediate formation of a commission to carry out final negotiations.
The Negotiations Commission met in Cacak but it was impossible
to arrive at an agreement because Germans had succeeded in puncturing our front at Valjevo and Kraljevo and with the help of supporting tanks were rapidly advancing. Extremely violent and bloody
fighting against the Germans developed all along the sector from
Kraljevo to Drina. At that time Mihailovichs Chetniks were openly
collaborating with the Germans. One night at Gornji-Milanovac, for
example, they deceived three hundred guerrillas, disarmed them,
stripped them of their clothing in Ravno Gora and, after subjecting
them to the most savage torture, dispatched them naked on a bitterly
cold night to the Germans in Val jevo. Almost all of these heroes were
brutally murdered by the Germans. At Mionica the Chetniks seized
seventeen nurses and a doctor, brutally murdered them and reported
(their "heroic" deed to the Germans. From that time on, close collaboration was established between Mihailovich's Chetniks and the German forces.
Throughout almost the whole of November our guerrilla fighters
rebuffed the superior forces of the Germans and Nedich's men. The
most violent battles were fought at the Valjevo sector near Vukovik,
in the Packi-Kupanj and Loznica sectors in Gornji-Milanovac and in
the Kraljevo sector.
In this campaign the Germans used strong infantry forces, tanks
and aircraft. Losses on both sides were very heavy. By November 25
the Germans succeeded in capturing U zice and Cacak. The main body
of our own forces retreated in the direction of Zlatibor and Ivanica
and the last principal engagements were fought to the river Ujac
between Sandjak and Serbia.
14

The greater part of the guerrilla forces filtered back in small detachments to the interior of Serbia, however, and from there continued
their heroic struggle against the invaders and their henchmen. Out of
the remainder were created our amazing First and Second Serbian
Brigades-brigades which, together with Montenegrin brigades, have
twice retraced a glorious path from Montenegro to Bosanska-Krajina.
From July 1941 on-while these events were taking place in Serbia
and while the men and women of Serbia were engaged in a superhuman
struggle against the invaders and domestic traitors-ceaseless fighting
was in progress in Montenegro against the Italian invaders also. In
December some 3,500 Montenegrin guerrillas attacked Plevlje, a
strongly fortified town in Sandjak, held by an entire Italian division.
With sweeping assaults our units broke through and in the course
of violent fighting occupied a considerable section of the town. Some
2,000 Italian soldiers perished in the street fighting. But after two
days of battle our units were obliged to withdraw from the town, for
without heavy weapons they were unable to seize the fortifications
from which the enemy artillery was constantly shelling the town. We
too suffered heavily in this engagement.

Battles for Bosnia
battles continued in Bosnia, particularly in Rogatica and
S
Zvornik, and by October almost all of East Bosnia (including the
towns of Rogatica, Vlasenica, Han-Pijesak and Srebrenica) had been
EVERE

cleared. Our troops were at the gates of Sarajevo, Romanija and
Stambolchik. In Lika and at Kordun our troops likewise liberated
much terirtory. In Bosanska-Krajina our troops had already occupied
Drvar and a number of other localities during August. Here the
fighting against Italians and U stashi became very violent. And here
too, even that early in the war, the Chetniks stabbed our units in the
back. That period marked the beginning of the glorious and epic
Kozara fighting which will forever remain the most brilliant page in
the annals of our struggle. There were also severe clashes at Petrova
Cora where the enemy undertook a number of violent offensive operations.
Action on a smaller scale began in the autumn in a number of other
points in Croatia and Slovenia. Sabotage had gone on there continuously, however, from the very beginning. .s\fter our withdrawal
from Serbia we occupied Nova Varos where our units had a chance
for a respite. Then the High Command, with one unit of Serbian
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troops, started out in the direction of East Bosnia. En route they
occupied the town of Rudo, where the first Serbian brigade was
formed. (On the very day after its formation this brigade smashed
three columns of Italians combined with Mihailovich's Chetniks who
were advancing in the direction of Rudo.)
At about that time the position of the guerrilla movement in East
Bosnia became very critical. Thus far friendly collaboration between
guerrillas and Chetniks had been maintained in that part of the
country. After the guerrillas had chalked up important successes in
East Bosnia, however, officers sent in by Draja Mihailovich began to
wreck the movement until gradually the elements which favored
cessation of hostilities against the Germans and advocated warfare
on the guerrillas gained the upper hand.
In East Bosnia Major Dangich and Major Todorovich were Mihailovich's chief deputies. Major Dangich was at that time in contact
with the Germans and launched attacks against guerrilla detachments
with the object of disarming them. Partly under the influence of the
demoralizing propaganda of these officers, and partly under the compulsion of threats, peasants began to desert the guerrillas, going over to the
Chetniks or returning to their homes. But the appearance of the First
Serbian Brigade in Eastern Bosnia produced a radical change in the
situation. As a strong unit, fit and disciplined, it rapidly acquired influenCe by virtue of its successes against the enemy and arrested the disintegration of guerrilla detachments. Those guerrillas who had gone over
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to the Chetniks returned to the fold, realizing that they had been misled
by the lying propaganda which alleged that the guerrillas had been
destroyed in Serbia. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in East Bosnia
guerrilla detachments joined our First Serbian Brigade in the fighting
which took place in December at Varos and Romanija.

Germans Launch a Second Offensive
had the guerrilla forces in East Bosnia reconsolidated their
ranks when the Germans launched a second offensive from four
directions: from Zvornik, from Visegrad, from Sarajevo (along the
Visegrad r~ilway line) and from Sarajevo through Romanija. In~o
this campaign they threw strong German forces supported by Ustashi
conscripts (Pavelich's regular units) and Chetniks. And before the
offensive got upder way the Chetnik headquarters in East Bosnia (with
Todorovich and Dangich in command) issued strict orders to the
Chetniks not to fire a single shot against the Germans. Instead the
Chetniks were either to hide or to help the Germans.
Bitter cold and heavy snow hampered our forces in these battles.
In view of the shortage of ammunition our troops were obliged to
abandon Rogatica, Vlasenica and other places after five days of fighting.
Carrying out a skillful maneuver the Bosnian guerrilla detachments
again attacked the enemy from the rear. In the meantime our Serbian
Brigade was divided into two parts. One of these retreated with the
High Command via Glasinac to Mount J ahorina. The other, accompanied by the Brigade's staff, made a number of astonishing marches
and reached Foca by moving past Sarajevo through the Sarajevo Valley.
During this march, one of the most difficult in the war, with the
thermometer dropping to below 25 degrees centigrade, about 160
men suffered frostbite and many had to have their legs amputated.
The first column, jointly with the High Command, succeeded in
checking the Germans and Ustashi on Mount Jahorina; and those
Chetnik defenders of the sector who had been abandoned by their
officers were placed under our command. A few days later Montenegrin troops and a battalion from the First Brigade occupied Foca,
Gorazde and Cajnice. Thus a base was again secured, not only for
rest and reorganization of units but also for mobilizing new reserves
of man power.
February, March and half of April were utilized for restoring
order and regrouping those Chetnik units-more than 10,000 strong-
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which, disappointed in Chetnik leadership, had joined our command.
Thus, in addition to the guerrilla detachments, so-called volunteer
units were formed and the High Command changed its name to High
Command of the People's Liberation Guerrilla and Volunteer Detachments. Throughou.t the winter and up to the middle of April
1942 (when the enemy embarked upon his third offensive) our guerrilla
and volunteer units were engaged in very severe fighting in the .lahorina-Romanija sector; around Rogatice, which was encircled; at '
Kalinovnik, where the Italian garrison was likewise encircled; and
especially in Montenegro, in the Kolasin-Sinjajevina and Niksic·
Grahovo sectors. At that time our Serbian troops occupying the Prijepolje Nova-Varos sector reached Cajnice. There the First and Second
Serbian Brigades were assigned the task of advancing toward Vlasenica
to clear that territory of the Chetnik gangs led by Dangich and Rachicb
who were openly collaborating with the Germans. After a rapid advance our brigades reached Vlasenica and Srebrenica, where they
completely smashed the Dangich units and hurled them across the
Drina River into Serbia. En route the second Serbian Brigade completely destroyed the Chetnik staff in the Rogatica sector, near Borici.
This advance through deep snowdrifts around the highest mountain peak, Denetak, was brilliantly carried through by our troops.
When in April 1942 it became clearly evident that the Germans, Italians and Ustashi were preparing for their third offensive, both brigades
received urgent orders to return to the Gorazde Cajnice sector.
As I have already mentioned, very heavy engagements were in
progress in Montenegro at this time-not only against the Italian
invaders but also against the Chetniks under Mihailovich and Major
Djurichich. How did matters come to such a pass?
Following the general popular uprising in July 1941 the greater
part of Montenegro had been liberated. Numerous guerrila detachments there attacked the forces of occupation constantly, menacing
their communications. N iksic was encircled and the Italian invaders
suffered tremendous losses in men and equipment. The Italians, who
did their utmost to discover traitors among the Montenegrins, found
them in the persons of Baja Stanishich and Major Djurichich. Moreover
Draja Mihailovich sent a group of his officers to Montenegro in an effort
to break the unity of the Montenegrins by creating detachments of
Chetniks there. At that time Baja Stanishich still maintained contact
with our general headquarters in Montenegro. Taking advantage of
this fact, he secretaly created his own organizations within the
guerrila detachments and thus succeeded in bringing a considerable
number of guerrillas under his influence and transforming them into
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Chetniks. His putsch occurred suddenly. Baja Stanishich, with a group
of his guerrillas, split away and went over to the forces of occupation.
In Vasojevici, Djurichich succeeded in mobilizing fairly strong forces
and equipped them with Italian arms. Throughout February, March
and almost the whole of April, and under the most difficult conditions,
our Montenegrin guerrilla units fought the combined forces of Italians
and domestic traitors. Therefore, when the enemy launched his third
offensive, a considerable portion of our Montenegrin units were obliged
to withdraw from Montenegro, fighting only rearguard actions.

The Third Offensive

T

third enemy offensive was thoroughly prepared and was conducted with almost all of the Italian and German forces, plus
the Ustashi and Chetniks. Beginning in Bosnia and Montenegro, this
offensive later spread to Slovenia, Dalmatia and Kozara. While the
Italian Pusteria Division, as well as several Chetnik detachments from
Serbia, were concentrated at Plevlje, two other Italian divisions were
concentrated at N iksic, Podgorica and Kolasin. Another division was
located in Hercegovina, near Gacko and Nevesinje. In addition to the
Germans 30,000 Italian soldiers were concentrated in the Sarajevo
Valley. 'Vhile the Germans advanced on Trnov and from Sarajevo
Kalinovnik, other enemy forces advanced from Plevlje toward Cajnice
and Foca. In Romanija, Germans and Ustashi were advancing toward
Rogatica from Gorazde. Beginning about the middle of March these
battles continued until June 20. In the face of superior enemy forces
our troops gradually withdrew from Bosnia in the general direction
of l'vlontenegro. In the middle of May 1942, when the enemy occupied
Foca, our troops began to retreat from Mount Sinjajevino and Niksic,
across Durmitor, toward Pivska Planina and Hercegovina. The severest
fighting during this offensive took place on the Goransko-Gacko sector.
Strong Italian forces and Chetniks exerted pressure from three directions. To save our units from encirclement at Pivska Planina the High
Command issued orders to retreat via Planina Volujak and Magljic
toward the river Suteska and swiftly transferred our best units-the
First and Second Serbian Brigades-to the Gacko sector and to the
country around Golija to stem the rapid advance of the Italians who
(with the object of cutting our retreat) were driving toward Gacko,
Cemerna and the upper reaches of the Suteska River. These units
handled their job splendidly although it involved severe losses. A
HE
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who were being evacu0/ . .
Neve\)lnJe
ated from Montenegro.
But after several very bitter battles at the apex of
the Hercegovina, Montenegro and Bosnia triangle all of our units, together with the wounded,
reached the TentisteKalinovnik sector. There,
Montenegrin and Sandjak guerrilla detachments
were regrouped into one
Sandjak, one Hercegovinian and two Montenegrin shock brigades.
This was the end of the third ene.'11Y offensiye in this most important
sector.

Our Counteroffensive
Germans, who lacked adequate strength to continue the
T
struggle in this area, concentrated their main forces against our
heroic town of Kozara. Extremely severe battles ensued. The German
HE

objectiv~ was to destroy the uprisihgs centered in Bosanska-Krajina.
The Italians were likewise unable to keep up the battle in this sector
because it became urgently necessary for them to reinforce their units
in Dalmatia and Slovenia since the popular uprisings had reached such
proportions, especially in Slovenia where a sizable portion of the area
had been liberated, that the enemy's most important communications
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were menaced. Moreover the enemy expected our forces on this sector
to be so worn down by hunger and battle losses as to be unfit for major
operations for some time. We left a few small guerrilla detachments
in Montenegro, the Sixth Bosnian Shock Brigade and several guerrilla
detachments in East Bosnia and a Montenegrin and a Hercegovinian
brigade in the Tentiste-Kalinovnik sector to protect our hospitals and
to conduct minor operations. The High Command decided to march
with the remaining units of the First and Second Serbian, Third
Sandjak and Fourth Montenegrin Brigades toward Western Bosnia.
In order to carry out this march through the difficult mountain regions
of Treskavica, Belasnica and so on, a detailed plan was worked out.
This plan called for surprise raids from Tarcina Trama on the
Sarajevo-Mostar line in order to destroy all railway equipment and
bridges. This operation, which was successfully carried out, resulted
in the destruction of several trains, all the bridges from Tarcina Trama,
a kilometer stretch of railway, all stations and about forty locomotives,
most of which were specially d esigned for use in the highlands. In
addition our units occupied the towns of Konjic, Ostrozak and other
places. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and several hundred enemy soldiers caught in trains were made prisoner.
The move against this railway was carried out from two directions.
One column advanced via Iguman (near Sarajevo) and, after completing its work on the railway, proceeded toward Kresevo, Fojnica and
Bugojno. The second column advanced toward Konjic and the railway
station of Bradina. Then, when it had completed its attack on the railway in two days of bloody fighting, this column occupied the strongly
fortified township of Prozor. After the first column occupied Gornji,
both columns joined forces for further operations. Yet before our
arrival, units from Bosanska-Krajina occupied the town of Prijedor
to ease the situation of encircled Kozara.
The arrival of these units at Bosanska-Krajina greatly encouraged
further uprisings not only in Bosanska-Krajina and Dalmatia but also
in Croatia and Slovenia. With the aid of guerrilla detachments from
Bosanska-Krajina our units, in addition to occuping Prozor and
Gornji-Vakuf, also took the towns of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Jajce,
Mrkonjicgrad and others. The capture of Livno was important, especially in stimulating a popular uprising in Dalmatia, leading to the
formation of new brigades and shock groups of guerrilla detachments
from Krajina, Dalmatia, Lika, Croatia and Slovenia. The People's
Liberation Army was formed then and the High Command was renamed the High Command of the People's Army of Liberation and
Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia.
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After the occupation of Bihac our troops began to fight their way
through to Central Bosnia and, after they had liberated a considerable
part of its territory, occupied Prnjavor, Kotar, Varos, Teslic and other
towns. This marked the liberation of a considerable part of Central
Bosnia, almost all of Bosanska-Krajina, part of Dalmatia, almost all
of Lika, Kordun and the greater part of Slovenia. Incidentally, the
greatest losses in this offensive were incurred at Kozara. The third
enemy offensive, concluded in Slovenia, failed because the People's
Army had so grown in strength and spirit.
During the autumn of 1942 the High Command sent one of its
members to Macedonia, there to enlist guerrilla detachments and to
coordinate operations with Greece and other neighboring countries.
It also dispatched its chief ' of staff and ten officers to Slovenia to
organize existing guerrilla detachments into regular units.

Italian and German Invaders Alarmed

T

major successes which the peoples of Yugoslavia had achieved
as a result of their superhuman struggle up to the autumn of 1942
seriously alarmed the Gennan and Italian invaders. As early as December, therefore, they began preparations for their fourth offensive. With
the object of tightening the ring around our main forces, this fourth
offensive began with a deep strategic envelopment. This time too,
as on previous occasions, the enemy directed his main blow at the
point where our High Command was stationed (a point from which
the most remotely situated units were under direct control.) The
Germans concentrated their forces at Karlovac, Glina, Bosanska,
Kostajnica and Banja-Luka. The Sarajevo concentration of enemy
forces was effected later, when it was expected that most of our troops
would be forced out of Bosanska-Krajina into the valley of the Neretva
and Vrbas Rivers. As in Gospic-Ogulin and Knin and Sinj in Dalmatia, Italian divisions were concentrated for this offensive.
As far back as December 1942 we came into possession of documents revealing that Draja Mihailovich had concluded an agreement
with the Germans to join forces with them in conducting a fourth
offensive against us. Throughout Montenegro, Sandjak, Serbia and
Hercegovina energetic propaganda was conducted among the Chetniks
to undertake an offensive against Bosanska-Krajina, where the Chetniks
were to take over power in the towns and villages and to liquidate the
guerrillas and U stashi.
The fourth offensive began in January. The Germans advanced
simultaneously on Karlovac from Slunj, Glina and other points in the
HE
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Banija area, while the Italians made repeated attempts to break
through the liberated territory of Lika. The Italians were repulsed
with heavy losses but, after fifteen days of fighting, the Germans (hurling great numbers of bombers and assault planes into the battle) succeeded in occupying the whole of Slunj and all towns as far as Kordun
and Banija. More than fifty thousand refugees from Kordun and
Banija who retreated with our troops (who were constantly engaged
in bloody fighting) were ruthlessly bombed by the German villains.
The number of victims was very great.
When the enemy approached Bihac, the High Command moved
to the Petrovac area.
There the High Command worked out the following plan: the
Croatian forces were to remain in their territory in Lika to defend it.
The Seventh Banja-Luka Division, stationed in the Slunj-Bihac sector,
was to fight a rearguard action to slow down the enemy's advance in
liberated territory. The First Bosnian Corps, now transformed into
the Third Corps, was to harass the enemy's rapid advance in the
mountainous region of Grmec and Mrkonjicgrad. The First and Third
Divisions were at that time stationed in Central Bosnia near the Sava
River and the town of Doboj, and the Second Division in the Livno
sector in Dalmatia. The High Command decided to concentrate these
three divisions immediately in a swift maneuver to smash weaker
enemy garrisons in the valley of the N eretva and Vrbas rivers and to
straddle the railway line from the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass to the
town of Mostar, thus enabling our troops to retreat with some 4,000
wounded soldiers.
In addition the High Command decided, after the retreat across
the Neretva River, to undertake a major operation in pursuit of Draja
Mihailovich's Chetniks and to clear the vile henchmen of the invaders
out of Montenegro and Sandjak as well as Hercegovina. To the
Second Division was entrusted the task of launching a swift attack to
capture the fortified town of Imotski and remaining points and of
making an immediate thrust into the Neretva Valley near Mostar to
cut communications between the Italian Command and its garrisons ·
in Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Rama, etc. The Third Division was dispatched to take the strongly fortified town of Prozor, occupied by the
Italians a month earlier. One brigade from the First Division was
ordered to seize the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass, thus cutting the KonjicaSarajevo line. Two other brigades from the First Division were ordered
to defend the road to Bugojno. As a result of uninterrupted marches
the three divisions reached their destinations in record time. They
were determined to take Prozor at all costs because it was situated
along our line of communications.
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We Foil the Fourth Offensive
J\ FTER two days of bloody fighting, two brigades from the Third

r'l. Division occupied the town, and the Italian garrison (about 1,000
strong) was completely wiped out. Extensive materiel was captured,
especially supplies of food and ammunition, since the enemy had been
preparing this town as a base for closing a ring around us as soon as
the Germans should give the signal. The Second Divisions occupied
Imotski, liquidated the Italian garrison at Dreznica and rapidly forged
ahead in the direction of Jablanica, where the Italian regiment was
stationed. After stiff fighting it captured J ablanica, destroyed almost
all bridges spanning the N eretva and captured further supplies. The
Ivan Sedlo mountain pass was also occupied but, owing to the rapid
intervention of superior German forces, our brigades withdrew in the
direction of Konjic (which they also failed to occupy during the first
assault). The Italian Murge Division, which held the entire sector,
was almost completely destroyed-only a few hundred men survivedand all its armaments fell into our hands.
The way had now been cleared for forcing the Neretva River. But
our units on this sector were tied down by the wounded, who were
still some hundreds of kilometers from us and who had to be evacuated.
Under the most difficult conditions of adverse weather and muddy
roads our trucks constantly carried the wounded to the Prozor sector,
whence it would be necessary to dispatch them across the Neretva by
truck as soon as Konjic should fall. The battle that developed in this
sector lasted 37 days. The Germans rapidly brought up forces. In
Bugojno the 369th Division, the 36th and units of the 1 14th were concentrated as well as strong forces of conscripts and Ustashi. The 118th
Division, swollen by Ustashi and conscripts, was advancing from
Sarajevo. Across Mount Pren, from Mostar and from Glavaticevo, the
traitor Draja Mihailovich dispatched over 10,000 Chetniks who, together with the Italians, were to stab us in the back and block our way.
But, employing tactics of swift maneuvering along interior lines, we
fought one of our most glorious battles for liberation there.
Battles between Donji-Vakuf and Prozor took on a dramatic character. The Germans had already succeeded in breaking through to a
point two kilometers away from our wounded. Rapid intervention by
the heroic Fourth Montenegrin and the Third Krajina Brigades saved
our wounded. Fighting went on day and night. Our side put into
action every weapon (such as heavy guns, tanks and other armaments)
it had captured during the rout of the Italian divisions. In the bitterly
cold weather prevailing in the mountains the Maklin and Radusa
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positions changed hands time and time again. Fighting ceaselessly day
and night, soldiers, especially those of our Seventh Division, were so
worn out that many died from sheer exhaustion in their forward posi,tions. During this time forces of our 'Fourth Montenegrin Brigade
and units of the Third Division were engaged in constant attacks on
Konjic, while the greater part of the Third Division was ceaselessly
engaged in stubborn fighting against Germans and Ustashi in the foothills of Bitovnja. Then, just as our units were occupying a section of
the town on the left bank of the Neretva River, Draja Mihailovich's
Chetniks struck our troops. Four of our divisions, along with 4,000
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wounded, were under attack from all sides. Nevertheless the High
Command decided to smash the enemy at all costs and to get the
wounded across the Neretva. After many days of stubborn fighting
and strong arilltery action on our part, our units crushed the Germans
in the Gornji-Vakuf sector and sent them reeling back in the direction
of Bugojno.
Before our units crossed over to the left bank of the N ere tva the
High Command issued orders to destroy all remaining bridges across
the river, despite the fact that we still had to get our wounded and
the army across. This stratagem, designed to mislead the Germans
into thinking that we had chosen to make our breach in a different
direction, succeeded completely. Near the ruined railway bridge all
our wounded and almost the whole of our army were able to cross
over. In addition to the four divisions mentioned above, the Ninth
Dalmatian Division which had retreated from Dalmatia in the face of
superior enemy forces also crossed over to the left bank.
The wounded were taken across to the left bank of the N eretva.
The enemy was crushed at Gornji-Vakuf and needed much time to
effect reorganization. Completely routed on the left bank of the
N eretva, the Chetniks and I talians beat a panicky retreat. Since,
however, we had wrecked all bridges before breaking through, we had
to destroy all our tanks and heavy guns.
But pursuit of Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks began immediately.
Our forces advanced in two directions: toward Nevesinje in Hercegovina and toward Kalinovnik. In the mountain area near Glavaticevo
and Kalinovrtik, Mihailovich's Chetniks were again so completely
smashed as to be rendered incapable of any further resistance. Many
of them began to desert to our side. Many more in their panic shaved
their beards and ~hanged into peasant garb to prevent guerrillas
from identifying them as Chetniks. After forced marches our units
reached Drina, crossed the river in the face of heavy odds and
smashed the Italian Taurinense Division on the right bank of the
Drina. During a swift march N evesinje and Gacko in Hercegovina
were occupied, while 'in Montenegro our troops got as far as Kolasin.

A Fifth B low from the Enemy

T

HE month of May was to be a month of rest for our glorious
divisions. But while we were busy clearing the Chetniks out of
Montenegro, the Germans and Italians and Ustashi were already
preparing for their fifth and most violent offensive against us. Our
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army countered this fifth offensive under the most difficult of conditions. Several thousand men were recuperating from typhus. , Owing
to exceptional rigors encountered en route, thousands of our wounded
were completely exhausted and required a long rest. But the enemy
gave us no respite and prepared his fifth offensive with the aim of
destroying us. He was aware of the fact that the High Command and
our best units were in Montenegro. This time, therefore, taking
greater pains to prepare his offensive, he dispatched far stronger
forces against us.
He transferred some of his divisions from Greece (for example the
First Alpine Division) to this new campaign and also threw Bulgarians,
Italians and followers of the puppets Nedich and Pavelich against us.
The fifth-and likewise the severest-battle began. And againthough at the cost of tremendous sacrifice-our glorious units inflicted
tremendous losses on the enemy and emerged without losing their
fighting capacity. Because the world has already heard much about
this fifth offensive and much will be written about it in days to come,
I shall not go into a description of its battles.
The fourth offensive was followed by our victorious campaign in
Montenegro which completely liquidated Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks. Since that time they have ceased to be of any military importance.
During both the fourth and the fifth offensives the units which I have
mentioned bore the main 'brunt of the war. But it was waged against
a background of fighting throughout much of Yugoslavia. Guerrillas
and brigades from the sixth Corps in Slavonia harassed enemy communications incessantly. Fighting was also in progress in Slovenia,
Dalmatia, Serbia and other places. Popular uprisings were spreading
throughout the whole country.
Far from intimidating our people and our fighters, the great attacks
which the troops of occupation launched against the main body of
our forces had a stimulating effect. Feats of mass heroism performed
in these battles will buttress our peoples' pride for many centuries
to come.

The People Begin to Govern Themselves

T

growth of the guerrilla detachments and People's Liberation
Armies integrated the power of our people. As early as 1941
People's Liberation Committees were set up in villages and towns in
the liberated territories of Serbia, Montenegro, etc: They replaced all
the old rural and other local administrations which had gone over
HE
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to the service of the occupation authorities. Originally these committees had as their principal task the provision of supplies to guerrilla
detachments but gradually they took over all the duties which rest
upon local, communal, municipal and district authorities. In the
autumn of 1942, when the greater part of Yugoslavia had been liberated, the necessity arose for establishing a central political body for all
Yugoslavia to direct all these committees and to relieve the High
Command of various political functions which had been constantly
piling up through the force of circumstance. It was decided to convene
an Antifascist Vece, or assembly, of the People's Liberation Movement
of Yugoslavia. It will be remembered that the Vece met on November
26, 1942, in the town of Bihac and was attended by delegates representing all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Far-reaching historical decisions
were adopted and an executive committee was elected. The Vece
represented all anti-fascist parties and united all political trends, regardless of religion and nationality. The Vece was charged with mobilizing
all means for helping the People's Liberation Army and with continuing to organize People's Liberation Committees, not only in liberated sectors but in territory still occupied by the enemy.
In addition to the Anti-fascist Vece of the People's Liberation
Movement a body with similar functions, known as the Slovenian
Liberation Front, was set up in Slovenia in 1941. In the spring of
1941 a regional Anti-fascist Vece was set up in Croatia and in the
second half of the year regional Anti-fascist Veces of People's Liberation were also set up in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, Sandjak,
etc. Simultaneously throughout Serbia the People's Liberation Committees organized a regional committee as their central body. The
difference in names is explained by the fact that because of the mass
terror maintained by Axis Occup!ltion forces, by the followers of
Nedich and by :M ihailovich's Chetniks in Serbia, it was impossible to
hold there general elections for this body.
On November 29, 1943, the Second Plenary Session of the Antifascist Vece of the People's Liberation Movement, held in the town of
Jajce, was attended by twenty delegates from all parts of the country.
This session likewise adopted far-reaching and historic decisions. The
Anti-fascist Vece was transformed into the supreme legislative body
of Yugoslavia, with all the rights of a parliament. The presidium was
elected-with 56 members and with Dr. Ivan Ribar at its head. The
Yugoslav National Liberation Committee was formed as the provisional
people's government.
This Committee decided to annul and reconsider all agreements
concluded by the refugee Yugoslav Government. It declared invalid
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any agreement which might be negotiated by that government in
future and it further decided to forbid the return of King Peter II
until the question of the monarchy and the over-all system of administration was finally determined after the war by the free will of the
people. Finally, it decided that Yugoslavia was to be constituted a
democratic federated union in which all peoples were to have equal
rights. Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Hercegovina were considered members of the federation.
This form of internal organization for Yugoslavia is not an abstract
ideal but represents a solution based on the will of all Yugoslavs, a
will tutored by the bitter experience of the past.
The attack on our country by German, Italian, Bulgarian and
other invaders marked the beginning not only of the extermination
of our peoples but also of a campaign of violence fanning up such
flames of hatred among the various nationalities as to threaten all with
a general conflagration. Under German instigation the Ustashi killed
hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Mihailovich's Chetniks, incited by
Germans and Italians, destroyed tens of thousands of Croats. Our
people were menaced with unspeakable dangers and faced complete
destruction. When our Serbian units reached Eastern Bosnia, thousands of bodies of innocent women, children and aged Moslems were
already resting at the bottom of the Drina River. In Bosnia and
H ercegovina, particularly in Krajina, we found huge gullies filled
with the bodies of massacred Serbian women, children and old people.
We immediately dedicated ourselves to putting an end to this horrible
carnage. We adopted the slogan, "Fraternity and Unity among the
Yugoslav Peoples" and exerted every effort to prove to the enraged
Serbian people and misled Chetniks that not all Croats were villains,
that not all Moslems were vicious, that only some of those in Ustashi
uniform were guilty of perpretrating crimes-and that those had been
committed at the instigation of the Germans.
We used all the means at our disposal to prove to the unfortunate
Moslem and Croat population that the villains responsible for these
crimes were not the Serbs but a handful of Chetniks led by Mihailovich,
Pechanats and Nedich. This work required tremendous effort on the
part of our heroic brigades and guerrilla detachments which were
engaged at the same time in a ruthless struggle against the forces of
occupation and also against Us tashi and Chetnik criminals-tools in
the hands of the occupation authorities. In this our efforts were
crowned with success: as a result of ou.r superhuman struggle, lasting
unity and brotherhood, such as had never existed before the war,
have now been established among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Today
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Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and every other
people are animated by one thought-that of speeding the expulsion
of the invaders from our country and of preventing the revival of
anything which in prewar Yugoslavia had contributed to the catastrophe; of punishing those chiefly responsible for bringing this terrible
tragedy down upon our peoples; of building up a truly democratic,
federated Yugoslavia in which the various peoples of Yugoslavia will
live in friendship.
The ' tremendous enthusiasm which spread among the peoples of
Yugoslavia (both in liberated and occupied areas) after the decisions
reached at the second session of the Anti-fascist Vece were announced
indicates that the principle which has guided us throughout our three
years of war-and which will finally end with the triumph of our
cause-was sound. It demonstrates, too, that we were justified in
starting a popular uprising at the very beginning of the war, before
the enemy was able to put his infernal designs into practice.
During three months of 1941, with the aid of Ustashi villains, the
Nazis succeeded in exterminating more than half a million Serbs in
Croatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Vojvodina.

A Plea for Recognition

T

who at home and abroad constantly preached that the time
was not yet ripe were guilty of a real crime against our people,
because they sacrificed their countrymen's lives to the murderous sword
of the invaders. And for more than two years the world was deceived
about the real state of affairs in Yugoslavia.
It is easy to understand how this confusion has complicated our
struggle. Our fighters and the peasants in the villages gnashed their
teeth when they heard the traitor Draja Mihailovich praised by various
broadcasting stations and newspapers at the very time when he was
fighting against us under the command of German officers. Let us
take but one example, the battle for Konjic in which Mihailovich
with his 1,800 Chetniks fought on the side of the Germans, Nedich's
men, Bulgarians, etc. During this period foreign broadcasting stations
reported that Mihailovich was attacking the enemy from the South,
thereby helping the guerrillas. It would be hard in all history to find
a parallel for the injustice thus visited upon our people while they
were making such sacrifices.
An end has now been made to this lying deception. The traitor
Mihailovich, along with Pavelich and Rupnik, has been nailed to the
HOSE
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pillory of history. We are thankful to our allies for realizing, although
belatedly, who it is who is doing the fighting in Yugoslavia and to
whom aid must be given.
During three years of superhuman struggle we were called upon
to fight under conditions for which there is hardly a precedent. A
small citadel of democracy within Hitler's European Fortress, we are
under constant attack from overwhelming enemy forces bent upon
destroying us. But what has frustrated the realization of Hitler's plans?
First, the unbending will of our peoples and their determination to die
fighting rather than become slaves of the fascist invaders. Second,
the profound faith in an Allied victory, brought nearer by the Soviet
Union. Third, the emergence, in this gigantic and unequal combat,
of our heroic People's Army of Liberation-an army increasingly
tempered and seasoned.
Today we have an army 300,000 strong, equipped with armaments
captured from the enemy. With Allied aid in armaments we can build
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up an army of 700,000 to 800,000 men. Working with our Allies, this
army will deliver the final blow to the German and fascist invaders.
Today we have our own true People's Government, developed in
the process of this struggle and elected by popular vote. Our people
desire-and believe-that the Allies will soon accord official recognition to this government as the only real representative of the Yugoslav people.
Today we have a supreme legislative body, the Anti-fascist Vece
of the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. Its task is to
prepare the reorganization of our country's institutions on the basis of
truly democratic principles. We also have-and this is our greatest
achievement-brotherhood and unity among the peoples Gf Yugoslavia.

